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Price-Fixing, Information Exchange and Concerted Practices in Türkiye (Law No. 4054 Art. 4): Fines, Leniency
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Short answer: Under Turkish law, Article 4 of Law No. 4054 prohibits agreements and concerted practices that have the object of restricting competition or that have or may have that effect; joint price-setting between competitors is the first example listed in the law. An agreement need not be in writing; agreeing on a price list in a WhatsApp group may be enough. Where an agreement cannot be proven, price similarity in the market is a presumption of a concerted practice; however, according to one Council of State decision reviewed here, price parallelism alone was not considered sufficient proof without evidence of communication or contact between the undertakings. In case of an infringement, the Board may impose an administrative fine of up to ten percent of annual gross revenue; an undertaking that helps uncover a cartel may receive no fine or a reduced fine. The settlement reduction is up to twenty-five percent; commitments are not accepted for clear and serious infringements such as price-fixing.
This article explains Turkish law. It is an English translation of the Turkish original; in case of any discrepancy, the Turkish text prevails.
Under Turkish law, joint price-setting, exchange of competitively sensitive information and concerted practices between competitors are prohibited by Article 4 of Law No. 4054, and the Competition Board may impose fines of up to ten percent of annual gross revenue. This guide explains the presumption of concerted practice, how fines are calculated, and leniency, settlement and commitments, with Competition Board and Council of State decisions.
Price-fixing, information exchange and concerted practices between competitors: Law No. 4054 art. 4, fines, active cooperation, settlement and commitments.
What Are Price-Fixing Agreements and Concerted Practices Between Competitors?
When undertakings that compete in the same market jointly set prices, discounts, payment terms or sales conditions, this is one of the most serious infringements of competition law. In Türkiye the basic provision prohibiting this conduct is Article 4 of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition.
“Agreements and concerted practices between undertakings, and decisions and practices of associations of undertakings which have as their object or effect or likely effect the prevention, distortion or restriction of competition directly or indirectly in a particular market for goods or services are illegal and prohibited.
Such cases are, in particular, as follows:
a) Fixing the purchase or sale price of goods or services, elements such as cost and profit which form the price, and any terms of purchase or sale,
b) Partitioning markets for goods or services, and sharing or controlling all kinds of market resources or elements,
c) Controlling the amount of supply or demand in relation to goods or services, or determining them outside the market,”
The concept of “agreement” is interpreted broadly. In the cement decision quoted below, the Competition Board stated that an agreement need not be in writing, legally binding or backed by a sanction. An oral understanding, a consensus reached at a meeting or a price list accepted in a messaging group can also count as an agreement.
A “concerted practice” is coordination that does not reach the level of an agreement but replaces the independent decision-making of undertakings. A typical example is competitors telling each other their future prices and acting accordingly. The law lists object and effect as alternatives; according to the 2025 Council of State decision discussed below and the Board’s cement decision, where conduct has a restrictive object (such as price-fixing), its effect on the market need not be proven separately.
This article focuses on the (horizontal) relationship between competitors. Vertical relationships, such as setting resale prices in dealership agreements, and unfair competition under Articles 54 et seq. of the Turkish Commercial Code are separate topics; for general unfair competition actions see Unfair Competition Actions. This article covers the enforcement of Law No. 4054 by the Competition Board through administrative sanctions; damages claims arising from competition infringements and unfair competition actions under the Commercial Code are separate topics.
Which Conduct Is an Infringement?
The list in the law is illustrative (“in particular”). The main horizontal conduct treated as infringements in the Board decisions reviewed is:
- Price-fixing: jointly setting sale prices, list prices, price increases, discounts, payment terms or the difference between cash and deferred prices. In the Board decision on the seedling sector, competitors were found to have prepared a price list in a messaging group and to have agreed on payment terms and discounts.
- Territory and customer allocation: competitors refraining from selling into each other’s regions or to each other’s customers. In the cement decision, the Board treated territory and customer allocation as restrictive of competition by object.
- Output restriction: jointly limiting production or sales volumes (art. 4/2-c).
- Exchange of competitively sensitive information: sharing future prices, costs, campaigns or customer information with a competitor.
- Monitoring compliance: tracking and warning a competitor that deviates from the arrangement. The Board treated this as part of the price consensus.
Information Exchange Between Competitors
Not every exchange of information is an infringement. According to the Board’s cement decision, information exchange may also generate efficiencies by removing information asymmetry and reducing search costs; however, exchanges that reduce or remove competitors’ uncertainty about an undertaking’s future conduct are sufficient to show coordination. Examples: next period’s price increase, a planned campaign, costs or a bid to be made to a customer.
According to the approach set out by the Board in the cement decision, information exchanges that aim at fixing prices or quantities, or that facilitate the functioning of a cartel, may be classified directly as a cartel. On the other hand, where the flow of information was one-sided and it could not be shown that the other side’s management knew of it, a regional administrative court decision upheld by the Council of State found no infringement because common intent had not been proven (see below).
The Presumption of Concerted Practice and Rebuttal
To address the difficulty of proof, Article 4 contains a presumption:
“In cases where the existence of an agreement cannot be proven, the similarity of price changes in the market, or of the balance of supply and demand, or of the operational regions of undertakings, to those in markets where competition is prevented, distorted or restricted constitutes a presumption that the undertakings are engaged in a concerted practice.
Each of the parties may relieve itself of liability by proving that it has not engaged in a concerted practice, provided that this is based on economic and rational facts.”
The presumption shifts the burden of proof to the undertaking: it must show that the price movement is explained by economic and rational reasons for example cost increases, exchange-rate changes or falling demand. The presumption has limits, however. According to EU case law cited by the Council of State, it is lawful for undertakings to adapt rationally to the existing and anticipated conduct of their competitors. In a 2025 decision, the 13th Chamber of the Council of State, taking into account the structure of the relevant market, stated that price parallelism alone, without evidence of communication or contact between the undertakings, is not accepted as sufficient proof of an agreement or concerted practice, and found the fine imposed on the claimant autogas dealer unlawful because its attendance at the meeting had not been shown. This article’s inference is that, without evidence of contact (a meeting, correspondence, information sharing), a fine resting only on price charts may be weak under judicial review.
Administrative Fine (Art. 16)
“Those who engage in conduct prohibited under Articles 4, 6 and 7 of this Law shall be subject to an administrative fine of up to ten percent of the annual gross revenues of the undertakings and associations of undertakings or members of such associations to be fined, generated by the end of the financial year preceding the final decision or, if this is not possible, by the end of the financial year closest to the date of the final decision, as determined by the Board.
Where undertakings or associations of undertakings are fined under the third paragraph, managers or employees of the undertaking or association of undertakings who are found to have had a decisive influence on the infringement shall be fined up to five percent of the fine imposed on the undertaking or association of undertakings.
…The undertakings or associations of undertakings, or their managers and employees, that actively cooperate with the Authority for the purpose of uncovering infringements of the Law may be granted immunity from the fines set out in the third and fourth paragraphs, or a reduction in the fines to be imposed under those paragraphs, taking into account the nature, effectiveness and timing of the cooperation and stating the reasons clearly.”
The ceiling is ten percent of annual gross revenue at the end of the financial year preceding the final decision (or, if that cannot be calculated, the financial year closest to the decision). It is an upper limit; the rate is calculated under the Board’s regulation. According to the seedling decision, the Fining Regulation of 15.02.2009 was repealed on 27.12.2024 and a new Regulation on Administrative Fines entered into force. The Board calculates in this order: the starting rate (taking into account in particular the seriousness of the harm and whether the infringement is clear and/or serious), an increase for duration, aggravating factors, mitigating factors. Because the regulation changed during the investigation, the Board in the seedling decision calculated under both regulations and, having reached the same result, applied the new one.
Managers and employees with a decisive influence on the infringement may also be fined up to five percent of the undertaking’s fine.
Leniency (Active Cooperation), Settlement and Commitments
Leniency (active cooperation)
The statutory term is “active cooperation” (art. 16/6); “leniency” is the name used in practice. An undertaking or manager that actively cooperates with the Authority to uncover an infringement may, under art. 16/6, receive no fine or a reduced fine. The detailed conditions are in the Board’s active cooperation regulation; this article does not reproduce that regulation. Under the wording of the law, the decisive criteria are the “nature, effectiveness and timing” of the cooperation. In practice the timing of the application matters; this article’s inference is that the first applicant and later applicants may not be treated alike.
Settlement
“After the investigation has been initiated, the Board may, upon request of the parties concerned or ex officio, initiate the settlement procedure, taking into account the procedural benefits of concluding the investigation quickly and differences of opinion on the existence or scope of the infringement. The Board may settle, until the notification of the investigation report, with undertakings or associations of undertakings under investigation that admit the existence and scope of the infringement.
…As a result of the settlement procedure, a reduction of up to twenty-five percent may be applied to the administrative fine.
…Where the process ends with a settlement, the administrative fine and the matters in the settlement text cannot be brought before the courts by the parties to the settlement.”
Settlement was introduced by Law No. 7246 of 16.06.2020. The settling undertaking admits the infringement and its scope, and its fine may be reduced by up to twenty-five percent; in return, it cannot challenge the fine and the matters in the settlement text in court. Settlement is possible until the investigation report is notified. In the seedling decision, the Board applied a twenty-five percent reduction after the undertaking submitted its settlement text in time.
Commitments
“During an ongoing preliminary inquiry or investigation, the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned may offer commitments to eliminate competition problems arising under Article 4 or 6. If the Board considers that the competition problems can be eliminated through such commitments, it may make these commitments binding on the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned and decide not to open an investigation or to end an investigation already opened. Commitments shall not be accepted for clear and serious infringements such as price-fixing, territory or customer allocation or restriction of supply between competitors.”
Commitments allow an investigation to close without a finding of infringement, but the law expressly closes this route for price-fixing, territory or customer allocation and output restriction between competitors. In the cement decision, the Board rejected a request to offer commitments made by a producer investigated for territory and customer allocation; the final decision does not give the reasons; the rejection was made by a separate Board decision during the investigation.
Investigation Procedure and Time Limits
Under art. 43/1, an investigation is completed within six months at the latest; if necessary, an additional period of up to six months may be granted once. Under art. 43/2, as amended by Law No. 7511 of 23.05.2024, the Board notifies the parties of an investigation within fifteen days of the decision to open it and sends sufficient information on the type and nature of the allegations.
Judicial review of Board decisions is available before the administrative courts; the time limit for filing, the competent court and stays of execution are outside the scope of this article.
The Issue in Competition Board and Council of State Decisions
Board decisions are not court judgments; they show the conclusion the Board reached. The names of the undertakings are omitted.
A price list in a messaging group: agreement and monitoring mechanism
Competition Board Decision — Competition Board, decision dated 21.05.2026 and numbered 26-19/572-217 (seedling sector; termination by settlement)
“…it is understood that consultations and meetings were held between competing undertakings on competition parameters such as prices, payment terms, price increase/discount rates and production costs, and that price lists were set directly. From the correspondence, [it is seen] that the undertakings jointly monitored price movements in the market and warned undertakings applying low prices…”
The Board found that seedling producers set price lists, payment terms and discounts in a messaging group and warned a deviating competitor. The settling undertaking admitted the infringement, and the Board applied a “25% reduction” to the fine under Article 43/7 and the Settlement Regulation. Because of the settlement, the fine and the matters in the settlement text cannot be challenged in court by this undertaking. The decision does not show the outcome for undertakings that did not settle.
An agreement need not be in writing; information exchange may be a cartel
Competition Board Decision — Competition Board, decision dated 12.03.2026 and numbered 26-09/278-99 (cement; territory and customer allocation)
“…for an agreement to be assessed under Article 4 of Law No. 4054, it is not necessary for the agreement to be in writing, to be legally binding or to contain a sanction.…Information exchanges that amount to an agreement/concerted practice aimed at fixing prices or quantities, or that facilitate the functioning of a cartel by enabling the monitoring of compliance with the agreed rules, may be classified directly as a cartel.”
In this decision the Board concluded that three cement producers infringed Article 4 through territory and customer allocation and imposed administrative fines calculated on their gross revenues. The decision was taken by majority; of the two dissenting members, one stated that there was insufficient evidence of the infringements and the other that the two findings relied on for territory and customer allocation were insufficient to prove the infringement. Whether it has become final is not known.
Council of State 2025: evidence of contact required in addition to parallel prices
“Accordingly, participation in meetings of a competition-restricting nature is considered sufficient to prove that the undertaking is a party to the infringement, regardless of whether the decisions taken at the meeting were complied with.…However, even if participation in meetings where competitively sensitive matters such as price and sales strategy are discussed is accepted as sufficient to prove an infringement of Article 4 of Law No. 4054, where the existence of communication or contact between undertakings cannot be established, the mere existence of parallelism between the prices applied by the undertakings, having regard also to the structure of the relevant market, is not accepted as sufficient to prove the existence of an agreement/concerted practice.”
In this case, a recommended price and a maximum discount rate for autogas stations were agreed at a meeting held at a chamber of commerce, and a committee was set up to monitor compliance. The Board fined the dealers it found to have attended the meeting. The Council of State reversed, stating that the authority had not shown that the claimant had attended the meeting (the authority had reported that the replies it obtained did not state who attended on the claimant’s behalf) and that, in that situation, evidence of communication or contact was required in addition to parallel pricing. The decision was unanimous and final; the file was sent back to the regional administrative court for a new decision.
In a one-sided leak of information, common intent must be proven
“…that, for a concerted practice to be established, the coordination or cooperation between undertakings must arise from a direct or indirect link between the parties…since it is understood that the said transfer/sharing of information could not be proven, by legally acceptable, concrete evidence free from all doubt, to have taken place with the common intent of both undertakings…”
It was alleged that price and campaign information had been passed by e-mail between two competitors in the white-goods sector; the Board found no infringement. The first-instance court annulled the Board decision, but the regional administrative court dismissed the action on the ground that it had not been proven that the information flow took place with the knowledge of the other side’s management. The Council of State upheld that judgment without separately discussing its reasoning; the quotation is the reasoning of the upheld regional court. The outcome is case-specific: the regional court relied on the lack of proof that one side’s management was aware and on price analyses that showed no coordinated conduct.
A single continuous infringement requires proof of a common plan
“…although, under the single continuous infringement approach, an undertaking need not have taken part in every stage of the infringement, for it to be held liable, by reason of the market or product in which it participated, also for the conduct of other undertakings concerning different markets or products, it must be shown that the undertaking was aware of the framework agreement or common plan, or at least was in a position to be aware of it.…each undertaking must be held liable not for the whole infringement but only for the part in which it was involved.”
In an investigation into interest rates and fees for deposits, loans and credit cards in the banking sector, the Board had treated twelve banks as parties to a single infringement. The Plenary Session reversed the court’s insistence judgment, stating that the common plan and each bank’s awareness of it had not been shown to a sufficient standard of proof and that each bank had to be assessed only in respect of the services in which it participated. The decision was taken by majority; the dissent stated that the Board decision had established with documents, bank by bank, which conduct each bank took part in and in which period. The decision indicated that a request for rectification was available; the subsequent stage is not covered by the sources of this article.
Practical Points
- Do not discuss future prices with competitors. Price increases, campaigns, discounts, payment terms and bids should not be shared with a competitor. In the seedling decision, competitors’ messages in a messaging group were the main evidence of the infringement.
- Leave the meeting and document it. According to the Council of State decision reviewed, attending a meeting where competitively sensitive matters are discussed may suffice to prove participation in the infringement even if the decisions taken are not followed. This article’s inference is that a person present at such a meeting should openly object and have this recorded.
- Association and chamber meetings. Decisions of associations of undertakings setting recommended, minimum or floor prices also fall under Article 4.
- Defending parallel pricing. In an investigation, price movements should be explained with cost, exchange-rate and demand data; art. 4/4 makes rebuttal conditional on “economic and rational facts”.
- Choose the route early. Timing is critical for leniency; for settlement, the limit is notification of the investigation report.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is sharing price information with competitors in itself an infringement of Article 4 of Law No. 4054 under Turkish law?
Not every exchange of information is an infringement; according to the Turkish Competition Board, information exchange may also generate efficiencies, but an exchange that reduces competitors’ uncertainty about future conduct is sufficient to show coordination. Sharing future prices, price increases, campaigns or costs with a competitor, however, may amount to a concerted practice; the Competition Board may classify information exchanges aimed at price-fixing, or facilitating the functioning of a cartel, directly as a cartel. Where the information flow is one-sided, proof of common intent may be required; in one decision reviewed, no infringement was found because this could not be proven.
What is the presumption of concerted practice in Law No. 4054 in Türkiye, and how can an undertaking rebut it?
Where an agreement cannot be proven, similarity of price changes or operational regions to those in markets where competition is restricted is a presumption of concerted practice (art. 4/3). An undertaking is relieved of liability if it proves, based on economic and rational facts, that it did not engage in a concerted practice (art. 4/4); cost, exchange-rate and demand data may be used for this purpose. In a 2025 Council of State decision, price parallelism alone, without evidence of communication or contact, was not accepted as sufficient proof.
How large an administrative fine can the Turkish Competition Board impose for a price-fixing agreement between competitors?
Under art. 16/3, the Board may impose an administrative fine of up to ten percent of annual gross revenue at the end of the financial year preceding the final decision (or, if that cannot be calculated, the financial year closest to the decision); this is an upper limit. The actual rate is calculated under the Board’s fining regulation, taking into account the starting rate, duration and aggravating and mitigating factors. Managers and employees with a decisive influence on the infringement may additionally be fined up to five percent of the undertaking’s fine.
Can a price-fixing investigation in Türkiye be closed by offering commitments to the Competition Authority?
No. Article 43/3 expressly provides that commitments are not accepted for clear and serious infringements such as price-fixing, territory or customer allocation or restriction of supply between competitors. Commitments may be used for certain other issues under Articles 4 and 6; in such cases the Board may make the commitments binding and decide not to open an investigation or to end an investigation already opened.
What is the difference between settlement and leniency (active cooperation) in a Turkish competition investigation?
In leniency (the statutory term is active cooperation), an undertaking or its manager actively helps uncover a cartel; under art. 16/6, no fine or a reduced fine may be imposed depending on the nature, effectiveness and timing of the cooperation. Settlement takes place after the investigation has started and until the investigation report is notified, with the existence and scope of the infringement admitted; the fine may be reduced by up to twenty-five percent, but the fine and the matters in the settlement text cannot be challenged in court by the settling party (art. 43).
Related Articles
- Unfair Competition Actions under Turkish Law
- Liability of Board Members in a Joint Stock Company
- What Can a Limited Company Manager Do Alone?
This article is for general information purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Statutory texts are taken from the Official Legislation Information System and decisions from the official case-law database and the official website of the Turkish Competition Authority. The decisions cited are not cases handled by the firm.
Author: Competition law attorney Bayram Can Çapar, Denizli, Türkiye - ÇAPAR HUKUK
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This article was written by Av. Bayram Can Çapar. At Av. Bayram Can Çapar · ÇAPAR Hukuk, we provide legal services with our team in Denizli, İzmir, Aydın, Muğla, Manisa, Uşak, Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya, İstanbul and Ankara, Türkiye.
Other articles in Competition Law
- Competition Damages in Türkiye: Treble Damages, Proof, Board Decisions, Limitation (Law No. 4054 Arts. 56-59)
- When a Former Employee Sets Up a Competing Business: Poaching, Trade Secrets, Unfair Competition in Türkiye
- Unfair Competition by Confusion in Türkiye: Trade Names, Packaging and Domain Names (TCC Arts. 55/1-a-4, 52)
Cite as: Av. Bayram Can Çapar, “Price-Fixing, Information Exchange and Concerted Practices in Türkiye (Law No. 4054 Art. 4): Fines, Leniency”, ÇAPAR Hukuk, 2026-11-15, https://capar.av.tr/en/article/price-fixing-information-exchange-concerted-practice-turkiye

























